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It is hardly possible to exaggerate the influence in the history of
England of the judicial reforms made by Henry II. Not merely does
the judicial organization of the present day bear unmistakable evi-
dence of its origin in those reforms, but our common law had its
beginning in them also, and their constitutional influence has been even
wider, almost world wide.
One phase of this last influence has been seen by some scholars in
c. 39 of Magna Carta." This clause is also, because of the later mean-
ing given to it, one of the most famous clauses of the Charter, and it
is one of the most difficult to interpret, if we wish to be sure that our
interpretation is the same as that of the barons who extorted the
Charter from the king. Two of the writers of the Magna Carta
Commemoration Essays published recently by the Royal Historical
Society,2 Sir Paul Vinogradoff and Professor F. M. Powicke, deal
with this clause, and it was the mnaer chiefly interesting the reviewer
of the volume, Professor Tait of Manchester, in the April number
of the ENGLiSH HisToicAL REVIEW. All three comment to some
extent, and the two last named to a large extent, upon the views
expressed in note "D" to chapter V. of my Origin of the English
Constitution, pp. 262-274. One feels a natural temptation not to rest
satisfied with even the best results in the interpretation of so important
and difficult a passage, and, when also one's own ideas have been
misunderstood and misstated, no doubt because of some obscurity in
the original statement, the temptation becomes irresistible.4
'Nullus liber homo capiatur vel imprisonetur, aut disseisiatur, aut utlagetur,
aut exuletur, aut aliquo modo destruatur, nec super eum ibimus, nec super eum
mittemus, nisi per legale judicium parium suorum vel per legem terre.
No freeman shall be taken or [and] imprisoned or disseised or exiled, or in
any way destroyed, nor will we go upon him nor send upon him, except by the
lawful judgment of his peers or [and] by the law of the land.
Text and translation from McKechnie, Magna Carta (2d ed.) 375.
"Magna Carta Commemoration Essays. With a Preface by the Rt. Hon.
Viscount Bryce, O.M. Edited by Henry Elliot Malden, MA. For the Royal
Historical Society. Ip7.
" (1918) 33 ENGisH HIsTORICAL REmw, 26r-266.
'Clause 61 is not directly germane to c. 39, but Professor Tait (E. L R., 1. c.
264) makes so tempting a suggestion-that the pope may have found in that clause
a legal right to interfere as suzerain and annul the Charter-that it can not be
passed over. The suggestion can hardly be accepted in view of the principle
on which c. 6I rests. In the clause the barons were demanding nothing outside
[450]
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In the interpretation of the clause, there are two points which exceed
in importance all others and occasion the most serious differences of
opinion: the classes to be included in the words liber homo and the
meaning of the phrase per jildicium parium vel per legem terrae,
including the force of ihe particle vel. Of these two the first seems to
me of much less importance than the second.
Whatever the barons who framed the Charter may have intended
by the words liber homo, there can be no doubt but that very shortly
they were taken to include all freemen. The effect also of c. 6o upon
this clause, as upon the whole Charter, should not be overlooked. If
it implies that in the body of the Charter neither barons nor king
were thinking directly of the rear vassal who was not at the same
time a king's vassal, it also says that the mesne lord must allow -him
the same rights that he claims for himself, and by inference the king
must do so also in the rare cases in which in 1215 the king would
come directly in contact with the rear vassal in matters covered by the
Charter. The effect of c. 6o would be to extend the benefits of c. 39
to all holders of land by military or serjeanty tenure. If we remem-
ber how very few the freemen were, outside these feudal tenants,
who would come into direct judicial contact with the king upon the
matters specified in c. 39, we shall conclude that c. 6o makes the range
of c. 39 practically universal.
the feudal law, no grant of new principle, nor any addition to the rights which
were recognized -throughout the feudal world as belonging to the vassal On
the contrary what they were really doing was to put limitations on their right;
they were agreeing not to exercise it until after certain expedients of a judicial
character had been tried. If the pope were proposing to base his action against
the Charter upon his legal rights as suzerain, he could find nothing to justify
action in c. 61. Indeed if he were appealed to because of civil war between the
barons and the king in which the barons had faithfully observed the clause, he
would be obliged, if he acted legally, to interfere in favor of the barons and
against the king. Nor would the pope's right to the annual cens be in any way
affected, nor the responsibility of England to pay it. He might no longer have
a claim upon John, if the matter were pressed to an extreme against the king,
but he would have a claim on the barons for the same payment under the
regular operation of the principle. If the lord lost his rights over his vassal
by an act of injustice, he lost his obligations for that fief as well. The vassal
became responsible for his share of his lord's obligationt to the next higher
suzerain, and more also by becoming responsible to him for what he owed his
former suzerain. This is the form which confiscation of the lord's rights took,
the correlative to confiscation of the vassal's holding. See 2 Viollet, Etablisse-
ments de Saint Louis, 8o (Bk. L c. 56 (52)) and notes; .3 ibid. 334; andcf. r
ibid. 161, and Digby, Real Property, 73. It is very likely that the blunt require-
ments of c. 6i may have excited the anger of John and of the pope, but there
was nothing in the clause of which either could complain on the ground of
legality. It should be added also that the plain purpose of the clause was to
prevent extreme action against the king, and that it would do so if John would
keep his promises.
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That those who originally framed c. 39 meant only the king's feudal
tenants, seems to me still the more probable opinion. The recent
arguments to the contrary leave the question in my mind where it was.
I understand Professor Powicke to suppose (Essays, lO8) that one
who does not hold that the barons intended to include the common
freeman must hold that they intended to exclude him. That in my
opinion is not the alternative. The barons were simply not thinking
about the common freeman at all. They had in mind only their own
class and their sufferings from the illegal or extra-legal action of the
king. The common freemen had not suffered in the same way from
these things. The king had not the same interest to interfere with
their rights that he had in the barons' case.' In framing the clause
the barons were thinking only about their own case, but they had no
conscious intention of excluding anybody. They merely used the
ordinary feudal language of the time with no particular thought of
its range of meaning. That the words had a wider connotation even
then than they had in mind was fortunate. It was still more fortunate
that during the next hundred years, from causes that were then just
beginning to work strongly in England, the class they overlooked
increased in importance in the state with great rapidity, while their
own class, as they then regarded it, declined as rapidly in relative
importance and lost interest in the things which in 1215 they considered
especially important.
I cannot admit that the meaning of liber homo is to be determined
in this clause by the usage of the Charter. I should say rather that
the usage of the time is so various that the meaning of the phrase
in every document and every clause is to be determined by its own
context. Nor can I accept Professor Powicke's interpretation of the
words in some of the other clauses. He believes that liber homo in
the Charter included the common freeman in all cases, and only admits
a doubt as to c. 34. But in c. 15 the non-feudal freeman is by the very
terms excluded. The case supposed could arise only in case of a
'After describing briefly the position of the free tenant "in the economy of
the manor," which was the position of practically all the common freemen in
1215, Mr. Powicke refers to c. 39 as "protecting them and their tenements
against illegal interference from the king and his officials." Essays, nio. The
evidence that the common freeman was consciously included in c. 39 would be
materially strengthened if it were shown specifically that the king had been
doing this in the particulars named in the clause, and how he did it in manors
not his own and for what reasons. In this connection it must be remembered
that c. 2o affords protection in a different case from any mentioned in c. 39.
It relates only to the operation of the courts of new procedure. That is con-
clusively shown by c. 21. The problem of showing how c. 39 applied practically
in 1215 to the case of the common freeman as a class, determined in his rela-
tions as he was by his position in the economy of the manor, is one that deserves
investigation in the further study of this clause of the Charter.
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feudal tenant.' That the common freeman was consciously included
in c. 27 is highly improbable. The clause was intended to protect
tenants in chief against the king in a matter in which protection was
very hard to secure. It is identical in meaning with c. 7 of Henry I's
Charter.7  Clause 34 can refer, I think, only to the possessor of a
baronial court in the technical sense, not in 1215 to the possessor of
a domanial court.8 There are only two clauses in the Charter, 20
and 30, in which the common freeman was consciously included beyond
a doubt.9
I have attempted no exhaustive study of this point. Such a study
6 Cf. i Madox, Exchequer, 599-6oo. C. 15 also shows that c. 12 applied to
no one but king's vassals. The rear vassal, who would always be a freeman,
had to be protected by special mention.
7 See Glanvill, vii, 16, 2.
' Sir Paul Vinogradoff says (Essays, 82) that c. 34 means only "that when
free men had courts they were not to be deprived of their privileges; free
men who had no courts were not concerned in c. 34 at all," as if this were
opposed to my view. I do not see that it is. I should say that the statement
is of course true, but that it is the same as saying that the common freeman is
not included. That is, the essential point is that the barons used the words
liber homno when they knew, if they thought about it at all, as they probably did
not, that the common freeman could not have any interest in the provision.
All that is asserted of c. 39 is that they used the same words in the same way,
not thinking of the application of them to any but their own class. At any
rate the new form of statement does not materially advance the discussion,
because the meaning of fiber homo must be independently determined in each
separate case, and the question as to c. 39 is who were consciously included in
the term. Professor Powicke (Essays, lo8, n. i) asks the questioh concerning
c. 34 whether any manorial court could not suffer from the writ and therefore
be protected by the prohibition. It is barely possible that it might in 1215;
though very unlikely. The vast majority of cases which led to the use of the
writ praecipe concerned feudal holdings and, though conceivably one might
concern a common freehold and might be begun in a domanial court, such cases
important enough to lead to the use of the writ would certainly be very rare
in those courts down to that date. After the rise of the court baron they might
fall into a court which was to all intents manorial. The size of a tenement is
of course not a certain indication, but the court records which we have from
before 1215 show that cases in the king's courts concerning small holdings,
except when parts of larger ones, as in cases concerning dower for instance,
are quite uncommon. But in any case the question is not what class of courts
were protected, but whether a non-feudal freeman would possess at that date
a court of any kind from which cases would be evoked by the writ.
"It should be noticed that c. 2o belongs to that portion of the Charter which
relates to the results of Henry II's judicial reforms, in which the common free-
man had a well defined place by inheritance from the old county court, and
therefore it was impossible not to have him in mind in such an enumeration as
that of cC. 2o-22. The reference to him here cannot legitimately be used to
show that he was consciously in mind elsewhere in the Charter. In c. 3o the
tenant in chief certainly had a greater interest than any common freeman, but
I think the latter must have been consciously included for it would be through
him in some part at least that the tenant in chief would suffer.
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would require more space here than its relative importance would
justify, especially as the conclusion must always remain largely a
matter of opinion. To me the balance inclines decidedly in one way,
but the evidence is of such a sort that every re-examination leaves the
question enough in doubt to warn against dogmatism.
The interpretation of the judicium parium portion of the clause
seems to me much more important because it not merely bears more
directly upon the intention of the barons in the Charter as a whole
but also because questions of procedure are involved in its under-
standing which have a bearing on the future development of law and
which it is important for that reason to keep free from confusion. I
must be allowed to say in this connection that I read with a good deal
of surprise the statement that I had pushed the baronial interpretation
of c. 39 to its logical conclusion, 0 for I never have believed and never
have said with reference to this clause that "the barons desired to place
themselves beyond the scope of the judicial system elaborated in the
reign of Henry II and Richard I.'  The evidence of such a desire
must be found outside this clause, and I supposed I had expressed this
opinion so that it would be understood in my note on this clause above
referred to, particularly on p. 272, where I intended to say that the
view I had just stated and illustrated was one with which I did not on
the whole agree.12  I seem to have failed, however, and must try to make
my position clearer. The conclusion which Professor Powicke states on
p. io3 of his essay is one with which I entirely agree. He says: "The
conclusion is forced upon my mind at least that the thirty-ninth clause
was intended to lay stress not so much on any particular form of trial
as on the necessity for protection against the arbitrary acts of imprison-
ment, disseisin, and outlawry in which King John had indulged."
That is to say, the barons were not thinking in this clause of the judicial
system elaborated by Henry II. If they had been, they would neces-
10 Essays, 96.
'I cannot avoid the feeling that the criticism of my views is due in part to
some little lack of clearness regarding judicial procedure and its bearing on
the meaning of the clause. I am confirmed in this feeling by the sentence which
follows the one cited above (Essays, 96). In this sentence the opinion is
attributed to me that the barons "meant no particular form of procedure, cer-
tainly not the processes of indictment and presentment." This is a correct
statement of my opinion, but it should be obvious that to hold it is to maintain
that the barons were not thinking of the judicial system elaborated by Henry II
and intended no attack upon it. If they had been attacking that sistem, they
would have had procedure most of all in mind.
"After pointing out what the clause would probably mean if the barons
were thinking of procedure (see p. 268), I said: "As I have already said, it
seems to me more likely that this [procedure] was not what they were chiefly
thinking of, that they were here less concerned with the contrast in procedure
between the old curia regis, and the new royal justice than with John's tyrannical
treatment of his vassals without any process of law of either kind." Origin, 272.
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sarily have been thinking chiefly of the new criminal procedure estab-
lished by the Assizes of Clarendon and Northampton. But why should
they be thinking of this? They had not as yet been troubled by it.
They never were seriously troubled by it.13 They were demanding the
traditional curia regis trial by judgment of their peers which was still
habitual in their case, not as against some other form of trial, but
against no trial at all, against condemnation without trial of any kind.
While I agree with the conclusion which Professor Powicke reaches,
I cannot agree with the line of argument by which it is reached nor
with the important subordinate conclusions of the paper. In order to
maintain the disjunctive use df the particle vel in the clause1" and the
translation "by the judgment of peers or by the law of the land,"
Professor Powicke feels obliged, quite correctly I think, to show that
a judicium parium is not the only way by which a case might be decided
in the curia regis.15 In both the necessity of proving this point and
" There was undoubtedly some danger that the barons might lose their ancient
right of trial by their peers through the development of the royal justice. The
advance in France in this special particular was more rapid than in England,
probably because of the institution of the Twelve Peers of France. This fact
was no doubt responsible for Peter des Roches's taunt in 1233 that there were
no peers in England and that the king decided all cases by his justices. The
barons were evidently troubled by the taunt but they did not understand its
meaning and did not know what to say. That is, the tendencies of the new
procedure were clearer to Peter des Roches than they were to the barons.
"There is a possible application of the phrase vel per legem terrae, allowing
of a disjunctive meaning for the particle, which may be worth considering.
In the enumeration in the first part of the clause of the things the king might
do, there are some which required no judicium parium. Capiatur vel imprison-
etur certainly did not in every case and going upon one or sending upon him
might not. Possibly it was with the intention of making the pledge all inclusive
and complete with regard to the acts specified that the phrase was used. The
chief objection to this suggestion is that it supposes a refinement of legal care
in this particular clause which does not characterize the Charter as a whole
nor the group of related documents. Or if we are to suppose such care, there
would be no objection to Sir James Stephen's interpretation (Criminal Law,
I. 162-163; Origin, 264) that the king promises judgment by their peers to those
who are his vassals and as the law provides to those who are not. This inter-
pretation could also be applied to the letter of May io and thus avoid the
blunder of putting vassals and non-vassals on the same footing in the king's
court. Those who insist on a disjunctive meaning for vel in this part of the
clause seem always to overlook its probable meaning in the first part. See
Origin, 262. I understand Professor Tait to hold (E. H. R., L. c. 261-262, 263)
that if vel is translated conjunctively the clause must be interpreted as an
attack on the judicial reforms of Henry II. The opinion must be due, I think,
to the belief that the judicium parium was not normally a part of the law of
the land.
' It seems a little unexpected, considering the place which judgment by peers
had held in the whole western world for centuries before Magna Carta to have
it relegated to such an unusual position in England as is given it in Professor
Tait's rendering of Professor Powicke's conclusion: "As an ultimate resort in
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the way of proving it, Professor Tait agrees with him. To support
this contention several cases are cited which are quite as important
with reference to the understanding of procedure in general and the
contemporary development of law as with reference to this particular
question.
The first case cited is a quarrel in 1205 between King John and the
Earl Marshal as to the right of the earl to hold lands of the king of
France after the loss of Normandy.' The marshal offers the judicial
duel; the king insists on "the judgment of my barons." Professor
Powicke supposes that the duel was offered as an alternative to a
judicium parium and that therefore there may be trials in the king's
court in which there is no judgment by peers, or, as Professor Tait
says, that it was "by no means the only form of trial even for barons."
This opinion appears to rest upon a misapprehension of the procedure
in the curia regis. The duel was a form of proof, not a judicium or
a substitute for a judicium. It stood in the same relation to the
judicium as did the witness proof, compurgation, or the ordeal. What
form of proof should be offered and by which party, was always deter-
mined by a judicium parium and, in theory at least, the proof was
always followed by another judicium making the final judgment of
the court. In practice I suspect that after some forms of proof, espe-
cially the duel and the ordeal, the final judgment was more theoretical
than actual, very informal at any rate and perhaps taken as logically
involved in the medial judgment. In no-sense, however, can the duel
be said to be an alternative to a judicium parium. The particular
issue in this case was clearly not between the king and the marshal,
exceptional cases, a special protection against the arbitrary power of the Crown,
something superimposed on the ordinary law of the land rather than a rigid
alternative to it." (E. H. R. 1. c. 262.) Of course if vel is used conjunctively
judgment by peers is not an alternative to the law of the land but a part of it,
as historically it undoubtedly was. I cannot avoid the impression from the
language used by both writers that they may regard judgment by peers as the
thing conceded by the king, as a right granted by him which he might have
withheld. That can hardly be the case, however, since it was a right which had
everywhere been possessed by feudal vassals from the earliest days of feudalism.
What the king granted was that he would not take the right away, that he would
respect it.
"The incident is related in the Histoire de Guillaume le Marichal, 11. 13149-
13244. This is the account of a poet not of a lawyer, but it seems correct
technically where it can be tested. Professor Powicke cites in a note a case
of disagreement between the barons of Poitou and the king related in 4 Roger of
Howden, 176. The barons ask for a judgment of peers; the king insists upon
a trial by combat. The principle is exactly the same, and the explanation is
plainly suggested in the context King John has brought together a court from
his various lands, as was the frequent practice of the Angevin kings in France,
and the barons, seeing a foregone conclusion, are objecting, as they were tech-
nically quite right in doing, that this is not a court of their peers and demanding
one that is.
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but between the king and the barons of his court. Apparently they
wished to choose a form of proof which would avoid a decision of
the question on its merits, while the king was determined they should
not do so but should put themselves on record in regard to holding
lands of the king of France while vassals of himself.
From the time following Magna Carta, two cases are cited. One
is a civil case of 1234 which is printed in Bracton's Note Book, No.
iio6, a case in which the king admits disseisin sine sumusonitione et
sine judicio. According to the heading of the record, the case is a
coram rege case before a single justice, and according to the record
itself the king was acttally present. As I understand Professor
Powicke, he thinks that the judgment was rendered in this case by
the justice and that no one else had any share in rhaking it, that is, that
there was no judicium parium.'7 I sincerely wish that this could be
shown beyond question. The year 1234 falls of course near the begin-
ning of the transitional period when the method of making judgment
was changing from the medieval method of the judicium parium
(judicium curiae) to the modem method of the justice-made judg-
ment,"" and just how this change was made has never as yet been
shown.1 9 It may be said, however, that all the coram rege cases of
The judgment rendered by the court in this case allowed the plaintiff to pro-
ceed to recover by the assize of Mort d'ancestor vel per breve de recto secundum
legem terrae. Vel in this case Professor Powicke translates conjunctively: "by
assize of Mort d'ancestor and writ of right," and on the next page he says the
decision points "to the legal process by assize and writ, to a possessory and pro-
prietary action." (Essays, 1o4, io5.) I think in this case vel must be translated
disjunctively.. The judgment allows the plaintiff to proceed either by a
possessory or by a proprietary action as he pleases, but if he chooses a writ of
right the posiessory action would be useless. Professot Po*ikke rightly
emphasizes the secundum legem terrae of the record. That this phrase is applied
to the assize and the writ of right in 1234 is interesting and noteworthy, but by
that date the new procedure was so firmly fixed in use that probably it would
be looked upon by hardly any one as unusual.
' Incidentally I cannot help expressing my surprise at the readiness, it would
seem almost without critical examination, with which the theories of M. Fr~ville
in his article in the Nouvelle Revue Hitorique de Droit Fran ais et Etranger,
1912, pp. 714 ff., have sometimes been accepted. (Essdys,, 102, n. 2.) M. Fr,-
ville's theory of the transformation of judicial procedure in Normandy between
115o and i25o, as being from the justice-made judgment to the judicium curiae,
implies a process of change the exact opposite of that which had been going on
throughout almost the whole of Frankish history, and exactly opposed to the
tendencies of Henry II's reforms. Such a thesis requires not merely unusually
strong supporting evidence, but evidence gathered and interpreted by the strictest
scientific method. Careful examination will show that a large proportion of M.
Fr~ville's evide'ace cannot be accepted in the use which he mikes of it.
" Sif Pai Vinogradoff in'his essay in the Commemoration volume (pp. 87-93)
makes an important and interesting contribution to this phase'of the subject,
upon one part of which the reviewer remarks (E. H. R. 1. c. 262) that it "hardly
seems called for."
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that date which can be studied in details of procedure are cases before
the Council and Council cases were then and have always continued
to be decided by a judicium curiae. The naming of the justice in the
title of the roll and the title itself at that date say nothing about the
particular cases on the roll, either as to whether they are really coram
rege cases in the later sense, as many of them are not, or as to the
method of judgment making, and there is nothing in the record of this
case to indicate that the justice made the judgment. The technical
phrases used are all quite regular of an ordinary Council case using
the old, that is the judicium parium, procedure: per judicium curie sue;
in curia sua fiat judicium; consideratum est.
The second case cited from the later period is the famous case of
the outlawry of Hubert de Burgh or rather the two cases, his and that
of Gilbert Basset and others, and their reversal in the Great Council
on May 23, 1234. The two cases are for the present purpose virtually
one and may be so treated. As such it forms a very interesting but a
very difficult case. I have said elsewhere that it is not clear what
should be said about it,20 and I am still in doubt. My doubt, however,
does not involve the question of a judicium parium. In that respect
the case is quite regular. The difficulty in the case arises from the
fact that the original proceedings in outlawry, as given in the earlier
records, do not seem to justify the allegations upon which the outlawry
was reversed in the Great Council.21 Professor Powicke has con-
sidered only the record of the reversal and therefore did not notice
this feature of the case.22 Outlawry was of course not a punishment
for the offense specified in the indictment or appeal, but for contumacy
in refusing to appear and answer, though there must be, or must be
assumed to be, a presumption of guilt, and it was therefore not a part
of the trial originally begun. In the original cases which led to these
sentences of outlawry, the king apparently el&ted to proceed against
Hubert de Burgh by inquest before justices specially appointed, as in
1233 he had a right to do,22 and against Gilbert Basset by appeal and
suit. If this is true, it would follow that their claim in these earlier
cases to be tried by their peers, though in real justice it met the issue
raised by the king, did not do so technically. It was not a demand
for a different form of procedure in the cases begun, but for a dif-
ferent kind of case and a different tribunal. They were right in
phrasing their demand as for a trial by their peers, because indirectly
Origin, 289, n. 14.
=1Bracton's Note Book, case 857.
' There is a considerable body of material bearing on this case, but reference
need be made here only to Close Rolls, 1231-1234, 161, 545. The latter is in
i Shirley, Royal Letters, 429.
2"In 1189 two methods of outlawry are in recognized use: per commune
rectum comitatus vel hundredi, and per appellationem per justitias. See the
proclamation of Queen Eleanor, 2 Benedict of Peterborough, 74-75.
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this raised the question of a judicium parium to be made in the
Great Council, because that was the procedure of the Great Coun-
cil, but this was not the main issue raised by the demand. That
was the kind of court. I do not think that either the barons in their
demand in 1233 or the Great Council in its act of reversal in 1234 were
thinking directly of c. 39 or of procedure in itself. If they had been,
the point would have been made clear in the judgment. The demand
in 1233 for a trial by their peers was a form of demanding a Great
Council trial and the case being in 1234 before the Great Council for
reconsideration, the demand had been conceded. I am inclined at
present to think that, whatever might have been true at any date prior
to Henry II, the original proceedings in outlawry in these cases in
1233 were quite regular, and that the reasons for reversal were put
in the elaborate shape in which they appear in the record of 1234,
because the reversal was a foregone conclusion and must be made to
appear well founded on some ground or other, or the ground of
reversal must be confused.
Whether this is true or not, it is certainly true that this case can
be made to show no alternative to trial by peers, and no violation of
that principle except as that may be involved in the original trial of
Hubert de Burgh by inquest before justices, that is by the new pro-
cedure. If that point be insisted upon here in his case, it would seem
to prove too much. For it would show that" in 1233 and 1234 the
barons in making their demand thought c. 39 to be a declaration
against the new procedure and an attack upon the judicial system
elaborated by Henry II. As I have said above I do not think this
was the case, and I do not think c. 39 was in mind at either date.
There can be no question, however, but that before very long the
progress of the new procedure in criminal cases raised this issue con-
sciously and that then c. 39 was regarded as a protection for the
baronage against the newer forms of trial. It was a hundred years
after 1234 before the issue was so raised as to be settled, and when
it began to be consciously formulated as an issue, is doubtful.
Professor Powicke has much to say about administrative or pre-
rogative arrest and punishment which is of interest and value. The
passage could profitably be extended into a special study of the sub-
ject, for it has never been thoroughly investigated. In the meantime
there is nothing in the evidence cited, nor in any evidence so far as
I know, to indicate that administrative arrest or administrative pun-
ishment were ever recognized as a legal alternative to a judiciurm
parium, or to any form of trial. In his interpretation in this matter
of the Edictum regium of 1195, which may be taken as typical of the
evidence cited, Professor Powicke sees in it a more decided departure
from the system of criminal justice established at Clarendon than I
can. It seems to me plainly to relate to extraordinary cases, and
I can find nothing in it to show any contemplated change in the
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ordinary trial procedure of the courts .2  There are new regulations
as to arrest, emphasis is somewhat different, and there is no direct
reference to action before itinerant justices nor in form to the jury
of presentment, but it should be remembered that every itinerant
justice was a special coinmissioner, and the action provided for is
to take place before special commissioners according to the Edict,
and that the per sacramentum fidelium hominum de visnetis of Howden
is the action of the jury of presentment. So far from making any
change, the document seems to me to indicate that the Clarendon pro-
cedure was working on the whole very well when the criminal could
be got hold of. That is the difficulty to which the Edict is directed-
the difficulty of arresting the suspected man. To the same purpose is
a writ of 8 Nov. 9 John, not cited in the Essays,25 and also the passage
cited on p. 116 of the Essays from the Calendar of Close Rolls,
1237-42, 356. This was one of the great practical problems of the
time, to get the accused man arrested and before the court, and this
fact explains largely the toleration of administrative arrest and
imprisonment in this sphere.
I understand, however, that Professor Powicke considers also that
the operation of administrative arrest under such measures as the
Edict of 1195 created a situation affecting the common freeman,
depriving him of a judicium parium, and that c. 39 was consciously
intended to restore his right in this particular. If the fact can be
established with a good degree of probability, it will be an important
contribution to the subject, for it will furnish what does not now exist,
an adequate reason for including the common freeman among those
to be protected by the clause. There can be no doubt of the prerogative
punishment of barons which deprived them of their right to a judicium
parium; complaints of John's action in this regard are well enough
known, and to my mind without a doubt this abuse is the chief
explanation of c. 39. But I understand the prerogative action con-
templated in the Edict of 1195 to be something quite different in pur-
pose and form, intended to enforce the law in a point which experience
"43 Roger of Howden, 299-3oo. Those named in the Edict to carry its
provisions out are miltes ad hoc assignati. In his account of what followed
Howden says: "Ad haec igitur exsequenda missi sunt per singulos comitatus
Angliae viri electi et fideles qui per sacramentum fidelium hominum de visnetis
multos ceperunt et carceribus regis incluserunt." In saying that those arrested
non deliberandos nisi per regem aut ejus capitalem justitiam, the Edict is using
the ordinary formula for the suspension of bail. See the regular practice in
the cases of treason and homicide, Bracton, ff. 119, I2Ib.
'A mandate directing the suspension of bail. Rex etc. Justiciariis et omnibus
fidelibus suis salutem. Prohibemus districte ne quis appellatus de morte hominis
replegietur vel in custodia tradatur vel ostagietur nisi per -speciale praeceptum
nostrum, sed in gaola firmiter teneatur donec coram justiciariis judicium suum
habuerit. T. Domino J. Norwicensi apud Wudestok, viii die Novembris. Pat.
9 J. in. 4. From i Madox, Exchequer, 494, n. u.
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had shown to be very difficult to enforce, not to violate it, and meeting
with the general approval of all but criminals. It will be necessary to
show that this was not the case, but that the law-abiding common free-
man was directly affected in his right to the ordinary trial, or subjected
to oppressive action by the king in this respect."
In the study of the operation of the judicial system as affecting the
interpretation of this clause, there seems to be some difficulty in dis-
tinguishing the old procedure from the new, that is, from the pro-
cedure introduced by royal innovation after io66: royal commissioner,
jury, indictment or presentment, writs, assizes, etc. It is important
to be able to distinguish the one from the other if we are to consider
c. 39 as involving a question of judicial procedure. Indeed otherwise
comment may go decidedly astray. In its simplest form the distinction
is easy to make, but it is complicated in the study of cases with another
problem which is not at all easy-the problem of determining just
what the relation was between the new and the old in the actual opera-
tion of the courts in the period from the Assize of Clarendon to the
virtual disappearance of the old-say roughly to the end of the thir-
teenth century. The subject has never to my knowledge been inves-
tigated. Primarily of course the new procedure belonged to the new
courts and should not appear in the old courts at all, but it gets an
entry into county and hundred courts through the sheriff's relation
11 There seems to me to be a tendency in the arguments I am considering to
overestimate the public importance of the common freeman in 1215. I have
no doubt there were at this date, and had been very likely from the Conquest,
individual cases of such men who held a considerable local place. I think it
likely that already members of the class had begun to improve their position
economically and in local standing. But certainly the evidence of such a process
is greater for the fourteenth century than for the thirteenth. Cases must have
been rare at the date of the Charter, of non-feudal freemen not living in manorial
or borough relations. And yet these would be the only men whom the king
could touch in the ways specified in c. 39, except in his own manors, without a
violation of property or other rights similar to those protected by c. 34. I do
not know of evidence to show that the king had done anything of this
kind. Even in the local juries of the new judicial system, where was used the
machinery of the county court in which the common freeman had his peculiar
field of public action, knights seem always to have been preferred to freemen
if there were knights enough. Certainly no evidence has yet been produced
to show that in the opening years of the thirteenth century the common free-
men occupied such a place in the community, either as a class or as individuals
as to call down upon themselves the oppressive acts of John which he is
required to abandon by c. 39, or to lead the barons naturally and consciously to
reason that they ought to be included with themselves in the protection
demanded. There is one way in which some light may be thrown upon this
question without much difficulty. The amount and character of the litigation
which this non-feudal class furnished to the royal courts of the time could be
easily studied and ought to show us something of the relative position, com-
pared with other classes, which this class occupied in the community life.
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to pleas of the crown and when he is acting as a royal commissioner,
and before long not merely these courts but baronial and even domanial
are using all the new forms so far as their needs required. On the
other hand the old procedure, appeal, foreoath, judicium curiae, wit-
ness proof, compurgation, ordeal, etc., had always belonged just as
normally in the king's special local courts as in the central curia regis
or in the old county court, and had been used in them from io66 on,
so that here again new and old appear side by side as normal procedure.
Accordingly we have in the same series of records pleas wholly of the
new procedure (Select Pleas of the Crown, Selden Society, Nos. 5, 6,
12); partly new and partly old in the same case (Nos. 8, 13, 16, 39,
4o) ; and wholly old (Nos. 4, II). It is not the place here to enter
further into this subject, particularly as I do not think that the barons
had directly in mind any contrast between new and old procedure
in c. 39.
In closing I must allow myself to say that the interpretation of
c. 39 appears to me one of those historical problems from which it is
almost impossible to exclude the subjective element. The weight of
the later interpretation still rests unconsciously on our minds. We
cannot bring ourselves to believe-it is I am tempted to think more
largely a matter of belief, than of proof-that is, we refuse to believe
that the people were not then in existence in something like the later
sense, or that the barons did not feel an obligation to include them in
the details of the "constitutional" guarantees which they secured.
Liber homo must have included intentionally every free man because
we cannot believe otherwise, and our minds revolt emotionally from a
cold and hard interpretation of the charter as a legal document rigor-
ously out of the legal ideas and facts of the time. I am afraid I think
that it must be so interpreted, if our purpose is to find out what it meant
in 1215.
